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CHAPTER I
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF TEE PLAN
Historical Perspective
While the basic concept of economic planning is far from new and can be
traced back to Plato's formulation of the basic idea in the fourth century
B.C., the scientific integration of the principles of planning into the frame-
work of economic theory has been accomplished primarily since the end of the
First World War. 1
Planning theory has, historically, followed three basic schools of
thought. Foremost of these schools, particularly in terms of the quantity of
available literature and in terms of impact upon the popular mind, has been
the socialist school. The socialist school has emphasized the humanization
of the wage relation and the equalization of the distribution of the nation-
2
al product.
Secondly, and equally famous, although presently less obtrusive is
the nationalist school of thought. This school is popularly epitomized in
the form of Fascism and Nazism. The prominent aim of these two movements is
the satisfaction of a seemingly insatiable lust for political and economic
power and centralization.
3
The third, and somewhat less well-known, school of planning is the
rationalist school. The economic rationalist, in the context of planning,
is strongly oriented along the lines of scientific methodology and outlook.
*B. C. Tandon, "Some Ideological Approaches Towards Planned Economies,"
Indian Journal of Economics
,
IXL, (July, 1958) p. l4l.
2Ibid .
3Ibid., p. 143
His primary concern is with the problems of optimization of available re-
sources. The scientific planner is traditionally obsessed, to a greater
or lesser degree, with the building of a state, or set of institutions,
which will function with machine-like regularity, guaranteeing the capital-
istic system conditions of maximum and perpetual economic efficiency. 2
The fundamental tenet of this so-called technocratic approach is the
"rationality of man". It is supposed that man, if shown the social ad-
vantages of directing his efforts in a certain direction and towards a spe-
cific end, can be induced to work towards this end with the continuous guid-
ance of the technocrat or the scientific planner.
3
Economic planning in both theory and practice has come into its own in
the main-stream of economic thought only during the past thirty years. As
late as the mid-1920' s the literature of planning was dominated almost ex-
clusively by writers, both socialistic and technocratic, of strongly recog-
k
nized leftward learnings.
It must be realized that, by its very nature, planning stands as an
almost complete contradiction of the phrases "pure capitalism" and
"economic laws." Economic planning inherently implies direction, co-ordi-
nation, and interference, and, therefore, developed an aura of repute only
with the collapse of the classical system.
Today, the basic question which confronts the modern society in its
economic life is not that of "plan" vs. "no plan", but that of "what kind of
1Ibid., p. Ikh
2Ibid.
3Ibid
., p. 145
^Ibid.
plan". The only alternative to planning through direction and/or coordination
is laissez-faire in its most extreme form. The reaction of "both the popular
and professional mind to the pitfalls of laissez-faire has "been such that, if
Sir William Earcourt were alive today, he vould he forced to admit that "we
are all Planners now". 1
Of the three schools of planning mentioned previously, the dominant
force in the American and in many of the European streams of thought of the
2
current decade is the rationalist school.
The "basic economic problems which concern the world of today, particu-
larly that part composed the underdeveloped or developing nations, are those
pertaining to the proper and efficient utilization of the productive re-
sources. The goals have "been designated in terms of economic growth in the
macro-economic sense; of increased capital formation, of rising levels of
Gross National Product, of a rising standard of living for all, or virtually
all, of the inhabitants of the nations. This is opposed to the goals of re-
distribution and leveling closely associated with the egalitarian socialists
.
Equalizing or leveling devices such as progressive taxation and planned in-
flation have, when utilized, been generally relegated to the status of means
to rationalist ends or else to ends of secondary importance. In short, where
the egalitarians have been interested primarily in the distribution of an ex-
isting national product, the economic rationalists have concentrated their
efforts primarily towards the providing of a greater and greater product and
only secondly with a normative distribution of this desired product.
•'-A. F. M. Durbin, Problems of Economic Planning ; Papers on Planning
and Economics (London: Eoutledge and Keegan Paul, I9X9.) p. kl
^andon, p. Ih8.
Definition: Economic Planning
Economists, over the last twenty-five to thirty years, have produced
a vide and varied assortment of definitions for the term "economic planning".
Several of these, however, stand out as heing uniquely articulate and compre-
hensive. Two such definitions are those of John E. Elliott and Karl Landauer.
Elliott defines planning as "the attempt to apply reason and foresight to
the ordering of human affairs and the attainment of human purposes".
Landauer claims that "Planning . . . (is) (the) . . . guidance of economic
activities by a communal organ through a scheme which describes, in quanti-
tative as well as qualitative terms, the productive processes that ought to
he undertaken during a designated future period."2
The essential purpose of planning, then, is to form a bond or a tie
between the reality of the present and the prospects of the future. It is
the attempt to formulate future programs against the successes and failures
of past performances and against the ever-changing goals and yardsticks of
the contemporary social and economic values
.
It can, therefore, be said that a plan is simply a "program for future
action". And to the rationalist, the core of the program is the allocation
of the social and economic resources in such a way as to subscribe to, and
to insure the enforcement of, the economic laws of distribution which have
so thoroughly permeated the confines of classical and neo-classical theories
of economic development.
1J. E. Elliott, "Economic Planning Reconsidered," Quarterly Journal of
Economics
, LXXTI, No. 1, (February, 1958) , p. 59.
ocKarl Landauer, Theory of National Economic Planning (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 19Vf.), p. 13
.
The Need for Planning
In order to "break down the harriers of social and cultural tradition
which have inhibited social and economic planning for centuries on end, it
was vitally essential that a real need for planning he demonstrated and that
the inherent characteristics of the unplanned or laissez-faire economy which
inhibit the optimum utilization of resources he vividly pointed out.
Capitalism, in various stages of development has many defects, allows
many to argue in favor of economic planning. Foremost among these defects
and the one which started the recent concern, is the problem of economic
stahility. The basic lesson which the history of the modern "business cycle
managed to teach hy 1930 was that an inevitahle product of private enterprise
and the invisible hand was a periodic "breakdown of production and distri-
hution which led to unemployment and associated poverty and social misery.
It is now widely realized that errors in judgment of opportunities and in-
vestment expectations have "become more and more costly. It was thus the
attempt to alleviate fluctuations in national income which led the way to the
incorporation of planning theory into the core of contemporary Political
Economy.
A second, and more recent, motivating force toward economic planning
has been the increasing emphasis on promoting and controlling the short-term
and long-term growth of the national product of both the developed and the
underdeveloped nation. This aim includes the attempt to provide a national
product favorably disposed to the ever-growing, and in some cases ever-
p
compounding, human divisor.
^-Durbin, p. kj
2Ihid. p. k9
Economists since "before the time of Maithus have realized the impor-
tance of providing an ever-growing national product in order to insure a con-
stant or increasing per-capita level of income in the face of a secularly
rising population curve. It has only "been in recent years, however, that the
potency of technology and invention as offsets to the tendency towards dimin-
ishing returns has been sufficiently appreciated to give rise to a coordi-
nated social movement to direct and plan by using this method of approach.
The third need for economic planning has arisen from the increasing
recognition of the. distinction between the Veblenian concepts of "finance" or
business and "industry" or active or productive investment. These concepts
point out the growing complexities that have increased the tendency for a
wider and wider gulf to develop between the saver and the investor, and be-
tween the owner and the controller of the modern corporate enterprise. The
inevitable need for the coordination of these independently motivated acts
of saving and investment has forced societies to take an active interest in
the process of providing channels for the making of investment decisions.
The fourth need for economic planning comes from the problem of con-
trolling the process of international trade. The self-regulating ability of
foreign trade was one of the last tenets of the classical system to undergo
a devestating collapse. But the attitudes of the contemporary political
realists in regards to the existing political situations have succeeded in
exploding this myth and in showing that in international trade (as well as
in inter-regional and in intra-regional trade) the proper contradiction of
"economic law" is, again, some form of "economic planning".
The fifth and final need for economic planning has risen from the in-
1Ibid. p. 51
i
ability of the unplanned economy to cope with major changes in both the
economic and non-economic spheres. Capitalistic systems based more-or-less
upon the laissez-faire tenets have proven to be somewhat elastic and capable
of coping with moderate needs for resource movement and reallocation. In
times of great economic and social upheaval, however, the methods of wealth
transfer and resource movement have been both slow and exceedingly harsh
under laissez-faire capitalism. It is precisely such an economic and social
upheaval which is now facing the nations of the underdeveloped world, and the
inelasticities i.e. rigidities and immobilities of the unplanned economy that
cannot be tolerated if the basic social and political framework is to undergo
p
a mutually advantageous and peaceful transition.
In the advanced nations it was the problem of stabilizing the economic
fluctuations which became to be regarded as uniquely inevitable that gave
rise to planning. In the underdeveloped nations, on the other hand, it is the
impending changes in the social and political structure of the society which
is forcing them take a closer look at the tools and virtues of economic plan-
ning. The need for economic planning in the underdeveloped nation then is
derived from the problem of coordinating and controlling the rapid evolution
of social, economic, and political institutions. Whereas in the advanced
nation the central interest in planning stems from the desire to re-time and
re-orientate investment decisions so as to prevent significant fluctuations
in the level of national income, the underdeveloped nation looks to planning
as a device for lifting its entire social structure and economic system from
American agriculture serves as an excellent example of this tendency.
2Ibid. p. 52
the depths of poverty and hackwardness to a
relatively high level of income
and general development. It is hoped that the
resultant rate of growth would
he in excess of that which would he possihle under
normal, free-market cir-
cumstances
.
One of the many prohlems vhich the underdeveloped
nations face is that
of the proper allocation of the factors of production.
It is the hasic
thesis of this author that the foremost cause of
underdevelopment and secular
stagnation in the nations under discussion is the inahility
of their economic
and social systems to effectively mohilize the resources
necessary for eco-
nomic progress to occur. Not only do these nations
face the normal prohlems
of economic inducement inherent in the advanced and
advancing nations of the
world, hut they are also hurdened with an incredihle army
of neutralizing
offsets to these economic inducements. These offsets often
take the form of
social and cultural rigidities which if not relieved or removed
are capahle
of permanently stifling all forms of economic progress.
These rigidities
are, hy their very nature, such that they cannot he removed
except with the
aid of "both time and a dedication for zealous reform.
Ohjectives of the Underdeveloped Nation
With the hasic need for economic planning in general in mind, it
is
possihle to derive logically the hasic ohjectives which the economic plan in
the underdeveloped nation seems to have. In their hroadest
form, these oh-
jectives appear to he two-fold. The first ohjective is the coordination of
the economic forces and resources of the nation so as to provide an
economic
climate favorahly disposed to development. This is in essence an
attempt to
holster the hasic inducement mechanisms requisite for the increased
mohility
of the essential productive factors. The second ohjective is to guarantee
certainty and definable direction to the future of the economy so that a
solid economic foundation can he formulated to aid the essential evolution,
or, indeed, revolution, of the social and cultural institutions. This in-
volves the instigation of certain economic policies, such as changes in the
fiscal structure, etc., to aid in the actual modification of these extenuating
factors. The precise nature of the social and institutional changes to he
sought will he discussed specifically and in some detail in the section de-
voted to the obstacles to economic planning, but it is important that their
implications in economic planning be at least acknowledged at this point in
the discussion.
In keeping with the attempt to control the productive factors of the
underdeveloped nation, the plan is concerned primarily with regulating, first,
the flow, quantity, direction, and accumulation of productive capital. The
plan is concerned secondly with the recruitment and cultivation of entrepre-
neurial talent, and thirdly with the training and education of the skilled
and semi-skilled labor force. Land is relegated to a lesser role in the
national plan simply because it, being a natural phenomenon, is generally
fixed both in quantity and quality in the planning period. Thus, direct land
policy control is necessarily limited to conservation, rehabilitation, and
exploration, rather than to extensive reallocation of the particular resources
except as related to the general transition from an agricultural to an indus-
trial orientation of the nation as a whole.
With this background information in mind,' it is now possible to list
and briefly describe, systematically, the most important of the specific
policy objectives.
The first of these objectives is to provide a platform from which a
development program can be permitted to take-off.
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The second objective is to provide a new and improved linkage betveen
ex-ante savings and productive investment expenditures. There is no phase
of economic development any more indispensible than that of capital accumu-
lation and the expansion of investment outlets. It is precisely at this
point that the cultural and institutional structure of the underdeveloped
nations seems to exert its most profoundly adverse effects. It is, therefore,
essential that a nation attempting a program of economic development plan
its fiscal and financial policies in such a way that a favorable climate for
capital accumulation be created.
The third object of economic planning in the underdeveloped nation is
to effectively control the foreign trade of the nation. Most of the under-
developed nations suffer from a chronic secular balance-of-payments diffi-
culty due, at least in part, to their highly inelastic demand for imported
goods (both of a durable and a consumable variety) and the relatively in-
elastic supply and the limited variety of the goods which they are able to
produce for export.
^
The fact that both their import demand and their export supply functions
are more inelastic than those of the nations upon whom they depend for most
of their foreign commerce, coupled with a secular, inflationary trend, caused
by the inability of the nations to expand their productive capacity quickly
enough to meet the rising demand for goods and services, forces the general
conclusion that the underdeveloped nations constantly face the threat of
coming out on the short end of trade agreements which are primarily determined
he
'Ibid.
Jandauer, p. 19
2,
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"by the nation's terms -of-trade position. Therefore, a coordinated policy of
international trade is desperately needed in the underdeveloped nation. Such
a policy will tend to holster the trading position of the nation through the
use of various methods of trade control, with particular emphasis on wuch in-
struments as discriminatory tariffs, priority-purchase lists, and exchange
control devices, and other techniques similarly adaptable to the particular
problems at hand.
The fourth objective of national economic planning is that of controlling
and directing investment outlays. Not only is there a real need in the under-
developed nations to construct devices which will lead to a more efficient
transmission of savings into investment, but also an equally vital need to
control the utilization of the savings which have been thus transmitted. In-
efficient allocation of investment funds has real and definable drawbacks even
in the most highly developed nations where capital tends to be in rather a-
bundant supply, but if such inefficient allocation is disadvantageous in the
advanced nation, it is catastrophic in the underdeveloped areas where capital
is acutely scarce.
The first and obvious duty of this phase of the economic plan, then, is
the proper utilization of investment in terms of social overhead or public
capital through the building of dams, highways / airports , etc., to facilitate
the inducement of complementary private investment. The second function of
the plan in relation to this objective is the actual designation of essential
participation in the allocation of productive investment. This could include
the constituting of governmental enterprise or the subsidization or direct
control, through licensing, etc., of private enterprise. The nature of this
1IMd
., p. 21.
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control will be dependent, of course, upon the economic and political struc-
ture of the nation involved and upon the effectiveness of the existing in-
ducement mechanisms in accomplishing the economic goals of the nation.
The fifth objective of the economic plan is to determine and/or control
the supply of trained labor and entrepreneurs through the vehicle of public
education. The Western world has not always thought in terms of public edu-
cationas a prime mobile of economic resources. However, when the supply of a
resource is dependent upon the effectiveness and orientation of public train-
ing, and when a nation has difficulty in keeping its training programs in tune
with current needs, to avoid incorporating such institutions into the plan is
to court disaster.
The underdeveloped world is, as a whole, blessed with an abundance of
labor, but, virtually none of these nations has succeeded in even closely allo-
cating this labor into the types of economic activities needed for development.
For example, most of the African nations are generally conceived of as being
faced with a severe shortage of entrepreneurial and administrative personnel
and with a similar shortage of facilities to train individuals for such tasks.
India, on the other hand, is often conceived of as having acquired too great a
supply of the intellectual elite in relation to the demand for their services.
The result is that India faces an underemployed intellectual class in addition
to facing a severe shortage of men skilled in the crafts and the technical
trades and with no apparent means of remedying this difficulty. Therefore, in
light of the conditions prevailing in the underdeveloped world, education de-
^W. Arthur Lewis > The Principles of Economic Planning ; A Study Prepared
for the Fabian Society (London: George Allen and Uhwin Limited, 19^9) P- 11.
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serves its just place in the economic plan both in qualitative and in quanti-
tative terms.
The sixth objective of the economic plan is to induce the inflow of a
substantial amount of foreign capital. Although it has already been stated
as an objective of the plan to strengthen the transmutation of savings and in-
vestment, there are many obstacles to the adequate fulfillment of such an ob-
jective which makes it essential that the domestic supply of investment funds
be augmented by foreign resources. Failure on the part of the government to
obtain such funds from public and private sources will simply mean that the
development process will be slowed, perhaps unnecessarily.
The last, but far from least and possibly one of the more important^
objectives of national planning is the reorientation of the economy of the
backward nation from agriculture to industry. The adequate development of an
industrial base is heavily dependent in these nations upon the non-agricultural
utilization of many resources, particularly labor, which are currently going
into agriculture. In order to re-allocate these resources and still maintain
a sufficient level of food production to adequately feed the ever-expanding
population of the developing nation, it is essential that a significant in-
crease in agricultural productivity be accomplished.
In conclusion, then, the basic prerequisite of an economic plan is
3that it be comprehensive. A plan, if it is to be effective in the finest
rationalistic tradition, must encompass all of the various institutions and
processes within the economic system which are capable of affecting either
1Jbid., p. 11*.
2
Ibid., p. 17.
^Landauer, p. Ik.
Ik
economic growth or economic stability. Obvious-ly, the intensity with which
any or all of these processes are considered in the plan is dependent upon
the individual problems of the separate countries and the type of planning,
i.e., directional or non-directional, positive or indicative, etc., but no
factor capable of influencing the solution of the basic problems under inves-
tigation can be properly excluded from the category of "appropriate subject
matter for the economic plan".
CHAPTER II
THE PLAN AND ITS OPERATION
Formulating the Plan
Economic planning consists of two broad, "basic phases. First the plan
must he formulated, and, secondly, it must he executed in a manner compatible
with its formulation and objectives. Some economists believe that the proc-
ess of formulation is the easier part of economic planning. Planning, in this
stage, consists of thinking, talking, writing, and hoping. It is usually-
accomplished by a group of individuals composing the central planning body
and requires very little in the way of leadership ability aside from the will-
ingness to work with the other planners. It involves talking about and ana-
lysing cultural, insitutional, and economic obstacles, but does not, in it-
self do anything about them.
The second phase, however, is where the plan meets its real test.
Officials draw up plans, but the people make them work. The deficiency of
most economic plans and planners is their unique propensity to talk rather
than act. The importance of proper formulation is not to be underrated, how-
ever, because proper analysis and careful delineation of the problem is the
necessary, if not the sufficient, prerequisite for constructive action. A
discussion of an economic plan must, by its very nature, begin by taking a
look at the machinery and procedures utilized in the formulation.
The precise nature of the plan and the prescriptions which are to be
expected from planning vary, of course, with both the magnitude of the job
to be done and the ability of the central organs of government to do the job.
However, any plan, regardless of the method of implementation, should at
Landauer, p. Ik.
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least examine all of the factors which might affect the plan. It should he,
as vas pointed out in the first chapter, a comprehensive document. The real
difference between various formulations should be in the actual prescriptions
for change rather than in the number of factors analyzed. 1
It is possible to put forth a general pattern by which a plan should be
o
formulated. In general the formulation can be divided into four basic stages.
The first stage of planning is that of determining the basic constraints
which bind the economic system and which limit and control the basic decision-
making process. It is, therefore, necessary to estimate the amount of nation-
al income which the country could presently expect at a full enployment
level. This is the "box" within which the projects of development must fit.
Against this yardstick, there must be placed the aggregate social desire for
consumption, investment, and the basic governmental services.
From this estimation of the national income a budget can be derived
which will be referred to as the master plan, or, more accurately, the
"master budget". This budget furnishes the essential data from which several
more specific budgets can be derived. These are, principally, the consump-
tion and investment budgets or plans.
The consumption budget shows two things. First, it shows how the people
desire to distribute their income between consumption and saving, and it
shows how they desire to distribute their consumption among the available
goods and services. Secondly, the consumption table shows the sources of
supply of these desired items, both domestic and foreign, and summarizes in
detail the probable points of chronic shortages and surpluses and briefly
^Tbid.
The basic outline of the stages of planning discussed in this section
is derived by Lewis, pp. 107-112.
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indicates the general reactions of these industries, in a historic sense, to
the various stimuli which might possibly he applied to alleviate these con-
ditions .
The consumption budget is dealt with first because, in a democracy con-
sumption is the most difficult item on the income accounts to be controlled
by direction. This is particularly true in an underdeveloped country where
the implementing institutions tend to be particularly weak. While several
methods by which some unnecessary consumption can be eliminated or controlled
will be pointed out in the section devoted to the implementation of the plan,
there is a limit below which the government is unable to suppress consumer
demand, and, therefore, to this degree, consumption must be looked upon as a
given quantity.
The second budget, that dealing with investment, is composed of several
parts. First, there is a delineation of the various projects which need to be
undertaken, in order of priority with those promoting export producing in-
dustries on top and agricultural improvement projects a close second. Second,
there is an estimate of the various raw materials which will be needed, as
well as a survey of the types of plants and the quantity of the variously
skilled labor which the fulfillment of the investment demand requires. This
budget also surveys the various sources of supply of the needed materials,
plants, and labor, and points out the probable areas of shortage or surplus
and enumerates the specific difficulties which will probably be encountered
in increasing the supply.
In addition, there is the table or budget of the government for the ful-
fillment of its role of provider of the basic services which governments tra-
ditionally provide, as well as a list of the various projects in which the
government hopes to engage in order to aid the development process. This item
18
will tend to take on a residual character, "being dependent upon the level of
national income, the percentage which will be available through either taxes
or credit, and the amount which must be committed to consumption and to private
investment. It is the remainder of the national income which may "be allocated
to government development projects or distributed in the private sector to he
utilized for additional consumption or private investment. The actual usage
of the funds is dependent upon the particular criterion being utilized by the
economy to form the priority lists and the ability of the various elements of
the economy to "best meet the established criterion.
From these three tables mentioned above, four others can be constructed.
First, there is a budget for each of the industries likely to be in "serious"
disequilibrium, showing the demand for the particular industry's product and
listing ways of meeting the demand and changes or courses of action which
might be initiated to attain the goals.
Secondly, there is a budget for each raw material which is likely to be
in serious disequilibrium, setting the demand against the supply for the
particular materials, and, once again, listing the possibilities of utilizing
various means of stimulation or limitation to correct the problem.
Thirdly, there is the man-power budget. This budget lists, skill by
skill, the supply and demand of labor and the possibilities of shifting men
from one skill to another through retraining,, the prospects of importing
skills in short supply and exporting those in long supply, as well as the
prospects of changing the general education programs so as to prevent the re-
currence of such a shortage in the future.
Finally, there is the foreign trade budget which lists both the supply
and demand for imports based upon the general consumption, investment, and
government expenditures budgets and points out the probable effects which the
19
shortage or surplus of Imports and of exports will have upon 1) the balance
of payments, and 2) the procuring of the consumption and investment goods
necessary to make the development program a success
.
Through the compilation of these "budgets the various factors involved
in the development program are classified and tagged, and the problems in-
volved in improving the situations are enumerated and possible solutions are
considered. It is in this first stage then, that the basic problems of re-
source allocation are isolated.
There is a real and positive difference between isolating and solving
economic problems, so the second stage of planning is that of charting the
proper course of action which should be undertaken to overcome the problems
uncovered by the first stage. The precise nature of this action will, as
earlier indicated, depend to a great degree upon the severity of the problems,
the social standards of the society, the stability and forcefulness of the
planning and governmental bodies and similar extenuating circumstances, but
in all cases we can safely say that the action delineated in this stage of
planning will be of two basic types.
The first type of action is that which is designated to increase the
supply of scarce factors. Underdevelopment inherently implies an aggregative
shortage of goods and services within the economy, and, therefore, action
aimed at increasing the supply of these items can be recognized as the prime
rationale of economic planning for the backward nations.
The second type of action is that aimed at controlling the use of the
available factors. This type of action is primarily a stop-gap measure to
help alleviate the adverse effects of the failure of the nation to obtain the
first objective. When immobility and factor shortages exist even after all
possible efforts on the part of the planning authorities have been expended,
20
then allocation al regulation s such as rationing, priority lists, etc., are
essential if the gains of development are not to be destroyed by inflation
and adverse foreign payments balances, but they cannot be utilized as a sub-
stitute for the first and mere positive type of action if development is to
be actually speeded.
Once the best course has been charted ana the modus operandi for exec-
uting the plan has been worked out, the second stage is complete and the
foundatio- for the third stage is set. This stage consists primarily of what
is commonly referred to as "target setting", that is, the setting of the goals
which the vario s segments of the economy are "expected" by the planning of-
ficials to attain. Probably no segments of planning are so sensitive, so rela-
tive, so often abused, so over-rated, and so controversial as that of the
establishment of the specific target.
In keeping with the rationalistic framework within which this entire
study is set, the target should be representative, not of what "should be"
or of what the public officials feel would make a popular slogan. Instead,
it should be an objective calculation of what the results of the contemplated
and prescribed action would be assuming that every person involved in the
implementation process did his job to the best of his ability.
In reality, however, the targets which are too often utilized in econ-
omic planning are not the result of such rational calculation, but of the
continual interplay of prejudiced forces of political power-struggles. Too
often such targets are designed so as to be easily attained and to thereby
maKe those implementing the plan appear to be more efficient than they actually
are, or, else, are designed to make the public feel that the existing govern-
iLewis, p. 109,
2Ibid., p. lip.
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ment is indispensable "because it is particularly capable of "doing some-
thing" and "getting ready to do something" which no other group dates to
promise that it can do. Whatever the object of an improperly set target may
be, the result is always the same: the defeat of the primary rationale for
the existence of the target, that is, to provide an accurate test of the de-
gree to which the various segments of the economy are carrying out the pro-
visions of the plan.
Good targets are highly useful, then, to the planning process, but the
less rational the base of the computation of the target, the less indispen-
sable the target becomes. Indeed it would not be totally unrealistic to
assume that the false sense of security and accomplishment furnished by an
exceedingly poor target would serve to make such a target in reality worse
than no target, or measuring stick, at all.
After the targets have been established, (assuming that it is deemed of
positive value to establish them), the final stage in the formulation of the
economic plan is that of publishing both the budgets which have been drawn up
and discussed in steps one and two and the specific targets which have been
established. This publication should explicitly and simply set forth the
basic goals of the plan and its methods along with as much basic data as the
public needs in order to analyse and criticise the planning operation and the
government's role in that operation. As Arthur Lewis takes great pains to
point out, such a step as this requires no excuse or explicit rationale in
any democratically oriented nation, for it is by this means that the public
enters into the planning process and acts as a check on the actions of the
government and the planning board, just as these organs have acted in order
1Ibid
. , p. 111.
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to check the operations of the consumer and his market.
It is true, of course, that, generally speaking, the public has no
method by which it can make a positive alternative plan on its own, and is
primarily limited to the more confined role of criticism, at least in the
short-run. The public can nevertheless just by criticism prevent a particu-
lar action which it feels would be harmful to its basic interests and, in the
long-run, can actually make, indirectly, positive changes in the system
through its power to elect a parliament. In turn, the parliament iw^ttn^,
can control the planning board through its power over finances, appointments,
etc.
In any case, it is vitally essential that the public be kept well-
informed. If it is not, planning runs the risks of eventually taking the
place of, rather than supplementing, democracy and unnecessarily abusing the
concept of limited consumer sovereignty and destroying the essential guide
posts, particularly in weakly administered nations, by which the reactions
of the electorate to the policies of the plan can be judged.
^b id.
2Ibid
., p. 112.
See also: Jan Tinbergen, Economic Policy : Principles and Design .
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Comuany, 1956) pp. 218-230
Tinbergen 's analysis of the making of the economic plan is interesting
although not particularly in contradiction to the program put forth in this
section. He proposes that the decision-making be spread over a large number
of governmental agencies. The underlying principles should be formulatedby the political parties, the actual planning by the governmental agencies.Such planning would be based on the use of personal directives, starting wnhbroad statements from which more and more specific pronouncements are derived
S JrJJJSi°us administrative levels. These are summarized in "declarationsof intent to be given to the public for its critical evaluation. Tinbergen
emphasizes the iinportance of coordination among the agencies and the im-portance of maintaining clarity concerning the division of tasks betweenParliament and the Government. Essentially, Parliament is to provide thegeneral framework within which the Government can make specific decisions
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Long-Kun vs. Short-Run Planning
Any planning body or government agency concerned vith the formulation
or the implementation of an economic plan is forced to pay considerable at-
tention to the question of the duration of the planning period. In the under-
developed and developing nations who have taken the lead in the field of eco-
nomic planning, such as India, there has been considerable emphasis upon the
selection of what we might call the "time unit" of planning, with a signif-
icant trend towards moderate- to long-term plans, principally, three to five
years or longer in length.
The targets in these plans, (particularly the aggregative targets such
as GKP, agricultural production figures, capital accumulation goals, annual
growth rates, etc., as well as many more specific objectives), are set in
terms of specific figures which the economy may be expected to attain at a
later date, probably between five and fifteen years hence. These goals or
targets certainly do have definite benefits to the plan in that they serve
to crystalize the thinking of the planners in regards to the direction which
the plan is to take, and to quantify some of the general aspirations of the
government so that the public has a concrete idea of the scope of the plan.
The real danger in the utilization of long-term planning is that the
quoted figures are too often presumed to embody more in the way of accuracy
and precision than they actually are capable of containing. It should be
remembered that "target" has been defined, within our rationalistic framework,
as an objective calculation of the optimum results which can be reasonably
expected from the prescribed action of the policy. Such a calculation can
have really accurate validity only over a very limited time period. 1
Gunnar Kyrdal, Beyond the Welfare State ; Economic Planning and Its
International Implication (New Haven: Yale University Press, 195877~p7~l28
.
2k
Over a period of five years or longer, not only is the process of dev-
elopment guided by the factors specifically tagged for control and regulation
in the plan itself, "but also it is influenced by exogenous factors which are,
for the most part, beyond the dictates of the planning board and are generally
of an unpredictable nature. These exogenous factors include such things as
the rate of foreign investment, vhich is determined by not only the Marginal
Efficiency of Capital in the developing nation, but also by the political and
economic conditions in the investor nation and in the remainder of the world.
Another external factor is the terms of trade, which, of course, depend upon
the elasticities of factor demand in the importing and exporting nations.
Furthermore, there are various cyclical fluctuations in the advanced nations,
as well as in the other underdeveloped nations, and, of course, numerous
s imilar factors
.
As one can see from the above, the main point is that even if the plan-
ning board is able to enact a comprehensive plan and collect an unlimited
amount of reliable statistics and thereby make its goals on a highly objective
and rationalistic basis, there are still too many uncontrollable, extraneous
factors involved in the general development process to make long-range plan-
ning targets much more than "a vague indications of aspirations". 1 Consider-
ing the conditions which currently exist in the world, particularly in the
underdeveloped nations, it is not practical, except in the case of capital
intensive industries such as power and communications, to plan in the precise
and technical sense very far in advance . Long-term goals can be nothing more
than a rough guide to indicate the general path of progress and should be ex-
pressed as such. The really vital budgets for planning are those which are
hh id., p. 129.
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framed vithin the constraints of usable knowledge by the planning board and
which spell out the procedures of the economy in day-by-day, month-by-month,
year-by-year, terms.
Directive vs. Non-Directive Planning
There have been several references in this paper to the controversy
concerning the proper roles of government and the market in relation to the
job of producing the proper reactions within the economy, or, in other words,
to the problem of whether the government or the market is to dictate the
allocation of the nation's resources. To bring this problem into proper focus
and to point out the precise relation between the two institutions, it seems
to be appropriate to devote a section to a quick summary of the problem and
a statement of this author's conclusions on the subject.
As was pointed out in the first chapter, it seems that the primary issue
in the underdeveloped nations is not that of "plan" or "no plan", but that of
the form which the plan should take. Essentially the question involved is
whether the planning authorities should attempt to operate through the market-
price system or whether it should, instead, strive to work around or suppress
the operation of the system, arbitrarily dictating the critical resource allo-
cations determined by the use of its own data and calculations.
The arguments against the total neglect of the price system and placing
complete reliance upon directive planning are quite formidable, to say the
least. Yet, it is virtually inherent in the term "economic plan" that a
certain real, positive directive action be forthcoming from the planning
authorities.
The first argument which might be presented in favor of the utilization
of the market system is that while the government is in a position to know
26
"better than the general public hov some of the national product should he
allocated, and while the magnitude of this area of authority varies from
nation to nation, there is still a wide area of spending over which the con-
sumer seems to demand control. To a certain degree, all citizens of any
nation demand freedom of choice, detest the use of wide-spread rationing,
and resist attempts to seriously impair their economic freedom. It is in
the consumer's market where the planners' predictions as to the reactions of
the consumers concerning the demand for certain products is tested.
Secondly, there is also considerable demand, on the part of the public,
to have a certain degree of freedom in the choice of occupations, location,
and working conditions, and, after a certain point, there is no way in which
direction can adequately replace properly planned inducements, financial and
otherwise, in getting the right kind of labor in the right place afr the right
time. It is, therefore, essential that some type of labor market exist along-
side the consumer's market.
Thirdly, it is impossible, with all consideration being given to the
quality of statistics, administrative personnel, and implementive organs, for
the planners, individually or collectively, to foresee all of the results of
their action. Therefore, the market can serve a useful role in determining
the answers to certain questions which cannot be properly answered by a mass
of collected and processed data and, thereby, substitutes for the partially
blind guesswork which would be made necessary by its absence. 3
Fourthly, it can be properly charged that planning by direction tends to
'Lewis, p. Ik.
2Ibid
., p. 15.
3Ibid.
, p. 17.
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"be too inflexible. It has "been pointed out that after the administrators
have made the thousands of calculations and have published their conclusions
"based upon these calculations, there is a tendency to strongly resist any
attempt on the part of the public, or of other government officials, to make
changes in the plan, even when these are clearly necessitated by the occurrence
of some unforeseen event.
Fifthly, there is a well-known and long-recognized tendency on the part
of the planners to proceed in the direction of over-standardization of con-
sumer goods. The fewer the variations in the products, the simpler are the
allocation and production problems, and, it is to the advantage of the planners
to eliminate many varieties of products from the planning schedules. 2
Elimination of the checks-and-balances of the market system tends to permit
the growth of such a tendency at a far greater rate, and to greater extremes,
than would other-wise occur.
Finally, a system of planning which attempts to supersede, the market
tends to foster the growth of an extremely large and complex administrative
staff. Decisions not made in the market place have to be made by the adminis-
trative body and the growth of a large corps of researchers and "adminis-
trators" is an almost inevitable consequence.
The basic premise of this discussion is that it is essential that a
nation which is attempting economic planning work out a compromise between
the market place and the planning board, relying upon the former as much as
possible without having to violate the basic objectives of the plan. In this
1Ibid., p. 18.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 19.
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vay the essential weakness of both the market and the plan can be alleviated.
The planning board should be utilized to coordinate the operations of the
market and thereby eliminate its most basic imperfections- At the same time,
the market should be utilized so as to establish the criteria which the govern-
ment of a nation may be less capable in formulation. Such a formulation is
difficult for the government to make of its own accord due to administrative
inefficiency, caused by inadequate personnel and poor systems of communication,
and by the lack of empirical data and methods of utilizing the data which does
exist.
Partial vs. Total Planning and Centralized Decision-Making1
Economic planners have been, in recent years, paying some attention to
the problem of the size and nature of the geographic area to be considered in
the various stages of the plan and to the related problem of centralization
and decentralization of the basic decision-making unit. The outgrowth of
the first problem has been the development of the concept of "regional
economic planning".
Regional planning has been used both in the developed and the under-
developed nations, but for different purposes and with different results. In
the advanced nations, particularly those such as the United States which are
not engaged in a program of comprehensive national economic planning and
centralized decision making, it has been employed to deal with chronic situ-
ations of disequilibrium. Two examples of this type of planning are the TVA
-'See William Keilhau, Principles of Private and Public Planning: A
Study in Economic Sociology
,
(New York: Bert Franklin, 1951) p! for"
another usage of the terms "Partial Planning" and "Total Planning". He defines
Partial Planning as "Planning for new enterprises" and Partial Planning as
planning for changes in old enterprises. Landauer's distinction, utilizedin this section, is more widely acclaimed.
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project, and the attempts by the various states to attract people and/or
industry to particular locations in order to strengthen the econoniy of the
area as a whole. In these situations, the regional plans are independent of
one another and generally uncoordinated.
In the underdeveloped nations, or in other nations which have insti-
gated comprehensive planning programs, regional planning has taken on another
aspect. In these cases, the regional plan is utilized to deal with specific
problems peculiar to certain areas, to facilitate the activation of a unique
program in one area with special problems, and to simultaneously utilize an-
other program in a different area which has unrelated or even opposite
problems. The major difference here is that all of the plans in the planned
nation are an integral part of the national plan and have been formulated not
solely in keeping with the self-interest of the individual region but, rather,
in keeping with the broad objectives of the nation as a whole. 2
The regional plan can also be utilized effectively when (l) the problems
of one particular area are far more severe than those of any other area and
a far more detailed and more forceful plan must be initiated in that region,
or (?) when the governments, or oliher decision-making bodies of one or more
given regions are either more efficiently organized or more adequately adapted
to the social and institutional conditions of the area than is the national
planning organ. Considering, in broad perspective, the general conditions
existing in the political structures of many underdeveloped nations, and the
^andaeur, p. 195.
2Ibid
. , p. 192.
3Jbid., p. 197-199.
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generally poor systems of interregional communication caused by both social
and technological obstructions, these aforementioned conditions might occasion-
ally exist.
In short, then, it can be said that the partial planning method can be
of positive value in developing the backward nation under certain given, and
frequently present, conditions. It is veil to keep in mind, however, that its
value lies in its use as a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, the
total or comprehensive central planning devices.
The Role of Statistics
The existence of an organ designed, such as is the planning board, to
make basic economic decisions for a nation, naturally creates a considerable
amount of attention as to the methods of gathering and utilizing a multitude
of statistical data. A rough idea of the value of such data can be quickly
discerned by examining the section of this chapter devoted to the various
stages involved in the formulation of the plan. It will be remembered that
data were called for to determine the supply and demand for labor of various
skills, of numerous types of raw materials, of endless varieties of consumer
items, etc., as well as the probable quantitative reactions of the various
suppliers to the stimuli which the planning agent could employ.
Obviously, if a truly accurate plan is to be composed, there can be no
substitute for precise and reliable statistics of both a contemporary and
historical nature. It is here that the paradox of planning in the backward
nation seems to come to the fore. It is these very nations which seem to be
in the greatest need of the gains of economic planning that are, in reality,
in the worst position, by the above criterion, to utilize such an instrument.
Surely a nation which feels fortunate when it is able to take a reliable popu-
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lation census could not be expected to simultaneously have knowledge of its
gross private investment in the steel industry in 1925.
1
However, this seemingly inevitable lack or scantiness of usable statis-
tics does not necessarily rule out the use of an economic plan. What cannot
be exactly measured can often be judiciously estimated, and it would be
reasonable to believe that a valuable plan could be formulated simply from a
comprehensive knowledge of the social and economic structure of the nation as
a whole. It does mean, however, that such a plan would logically be far more
subject to errors in calculation and forecasting than it would be if the de-
sired data were available. 2
It also means that, as a general rule, the poorer the quality of pri-
mary statistics the greater must be the reliance upon the checks imposed by
the market system and the virtues of less -centralized or regional planning
(since the local or provincial officials would be more likely to have the re-
quisite knowledge of the conditions of a particular region than are the members
of the central planning office)
.
Less emphasis can be laid on long-term and
inflexible planning.
In essence, then, it can be said that precise and definite statistics
have a vital role to play in the formulation of the economic plan, and the
governments of nations interested in planning should make every possible effort
to improve and expand the techniques of collecting data. At the same time it
should not be forgotten that this data is only an aid, not the foundation, for
planning. Valuable results can be obtained from plans which have been formulated
"TJnless, of course, the I925 figure happened to be zero.
Walter Krause, Economic Development : The Underdeveloped World and
|^jfgf| g|2r^n^an-Francisco: Wadsworth Publishing' ComianFlncT,
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from estimated, rather than detailed, accurate economic statistics.
Implementing the Plan
As was pointed out in the first section of this chapter, planning must
proceed in two phases; first, the plan must he formulated, and, secondly, it
must be implemented. The formulation has been covered, hut that is only part
of the story and, it might he added, the easy part.
Proper implementation is, generally speaking, dependent upon two factors.
First, it is dependent upon a powerful and realistic plan of action outlined
in the second phase of the plan. Second, it is dependent upon a strong ad-
ministrative team, dedicated to see that the prescribed action is effectively
carried out. It is, of course, in the second part that planning is most
likely to bog down.
Failure at the implementing level is caused by (1) a lack, in either
relative or absolute terms, of a sufficient supply of trained personnel, (2)
by an inherently weak, because of constitutional provisions, etc., governmental
structure, or (3) by a historic and ingrained unwillingness on the part of the
inhabitants of the nation to follow governmental suggestions or directives.
In short, effective implementation of the plan depends upon a high degree of
morale on the part of the government or planning body as well as on the part
of the public.
If the problems stem from a weak and ineffective governmental body,
means must be taken to strengthen this organization. If possible, such re-
inforcement should be done within the present governmental framework, so as to
take advantage of the existing political machinery. Such corrections might be
1Landauer, p. 15.
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made by bringing in personnel to operate the plan from outside the present
heirarchy of political elite, and by making substantial reforms in the civil
service or other selection mechanisms so as to enforce higher standards on
future employees, to weed out the existing incompetent officials, and to break
down any existing problems of political patronage, etc. 1 If the governmental
structure itself is particularly inhibiting towards the entire planning pro-
gram, it might be necessary to institute a sweeping series of comprehensive
constitutional reforms as a necessary condition to effective implementation.
Under certain conditions when such reforms might be. politically infeasible,
economic planning might, for all practical purposes, be rendered helpless.
There is, however, at least one alternative method of working with an
economic plan in spite of these barriers. This is the possibility of creating
a separate and independent planning agency which has no connection with the
regular governmental body. Lenin, for example, was forced to use this tech-
nique in Russia in order to negate the turmoil and frustrations of the then
present political institutions. 2
,i
The above method is, of course, a method of last resort since the social
and economic cost of building such a comprehensive agency from the ground up
is inevitably high. It means building an administrative body of high caliber
men, instituting a separate means of selecting and training a vast army of ad-
ministrators and "economists", and asserting sufficient assumed authority to
counteract attempts by the existing political heirarchy to sabotage the efforts
of the new planning board to supersede its jurisdiction. All this must be done
within a very short period of time. Such a technique can hardly be called a
1Ibid., p. 21.
2Myrdal, p. 127.
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panacea, then, simply because its' effective organization requires a caliber
of leadership not normally found in sufficient quantity in the underdeveloped
nation, and because it runs the risk of expanding its power to the control of
factors other than the economic plan, that is, .the risk of creating a dictator-
ship to take the place of, rather than to supplement, the existing government
of the nation.
The moral to this discussion is simply that a plan cannot be any
stronger than the institutions assigned to administer it, and, if these in-
stitutions are inherently weak for one reason or another, it is essential that
steps be taken to strengthen them or else it will simply be necessary to accept
a poorly implemented plan. Even if the administrative system of the nation in
question should be of an ideal nature, a low level of public morale or an in-
herent unwillingness to engage in national cooperation at the expense of in-
dividual self-interest is capable of frustrating the objectives of the plan.
For example, even if the government has designed an "ideal" tax system,
it may be impossible to effectively finance development if the public feels no
obligation to pay the assessed duties. Again, it is impossible for the govern-
ment to increase the supply of vital productive factors if the producers are
predisposed to restrict output in order to collect monopoly profits. There
are, of course, tools which an effective planning board can utilize to over-
come apathy such as this, assuming that the society has not evolved to a state
of total anarchy.
The first tool at the command of the planning board is that of dis-
cretionary monetary and fiscal policy. Even if there is a high propensity on
the part of the public to evade taxes, there is in most nations a considerable
iiewis, p. 20.
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range of taxable income on which the tax is not easily evaded, except, of
course, through lax administration. Again, even if the public does not feel
a moral obligation to stop buying excessive amounts of unnecessary consumer
items, they can be forcefully restrained by a discretionary credit policy in-
stituted through a strong banking system.
Secondly, if the entrepreneurs continually refuse to expand output and
lower prices as requested by the planners, the government can force expansion
by opening its own plants in competition with the existing enterprises and
force a favorable reaction from the private entrepreneurs. In many cases,
simply the threat of such action is sufficient to cause the producers to fall
into line. 1
Thirdly, if the laboring classes place their selfish desires above the
success of the plan, and if the producers are just as determined to hold the
line, the deadlock can be broken effectively through powerful labor arbi-
tration procedures.
^
All in all, the general rule can be established that the lower the level
of public morale the more powerful must be the institutions and the more def-
inite must be the guidelines of the planning mechanism. With such a low
morale seeming to predominate many of the underdeveloped areas, it is almost
mandatory that a planning system which is to be firmly and effectively imple-
mented combine a powerful group of leaders and administrators with strong
economic institutions, such as a we11
-organized banking system, a strong set
of labor laws, well-defined import-export agreements, a stiff, yet simplified,
tax structure, etc.
1Ibid
., p. 21.
cLandauer, pp. 109-111.
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Some nations, when confronted with too many social and institutional
obstacles to the construction of such a mechanism, have often resorted to a
course of attempting to talk their way to development. They seem to feel
that through the utilization of numerous speeches, articles, etc., the people
can he given a nationalistic spirit and an intrinsic "desire for development".
Speech-making certainly has a place in the over-all aspect of inter-
personal communications, and there are possibly valid grounds for assuming
that a veil-timed oration on the part of a respected national leader can give
a backward nation a significant amount of badly needed nationalistic pride.
Such activities however should be in addition to effective steps on the part
of the same officials to gain the desired goals. Speech-making without action
quickly becomes exhortation, and planning by* exhortation is virtually tanta-
mount to not planning at all.
,<
The number one rule in implementing economic plans, then, is that there
are no shortcuts. Weak institutions must be made stronger, and incompetent
personnel must be replaced with stronger individuals if planning is going to
be worth the time and effort which must necessarily go into its formulation.
hewis, p. 112.
CHAPTER III
OBSTACLES TO PLANNING
Social, Cultural, and Institutional Obstacles
It can be easily seen by the preceding discussion of the economic plan,
how, under ideal conditions, the problems surrounding its implementation,
stemming just from the complexity of the plan, could easily be of a grave and
significant nature. This paper is concerned specifically with planning as it
can be utilized in the underdeveloped or developing nation, nations in which
the basic conditions, social, political, economic, and institutional, are far
from ideal. It is, therefore, essential that any discussion of planning in
these nations summarize, at least briefly, the basic obstacles to the plan.
First, the economic planner is faced with the rigidities of the social
structure. Most of the backward nations are characterized by an entrenched
caste or class system through which the social status and occupation, and even
liberties and privileges, of the individual are determined. Although rel-
atively free movement within a certain level of the system may or may not be
possible, the inability to move vertically on the social scale is virtually
a foregone conclusion. The result is the existence of barriers to labor mo-
bility based upon birth rather than on initiative, ability, or general social
utility.
It is inevitable that under such a situation the attainment of an opti-
mum resource allocation is virtually impossible,. Many highly capable individ-
uals will be overlooked for important jobs in the economy because their social
status says that they are either not good enough to qualify for training, or
•^Krause, p. 52.
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else too good to engage in such enterprises. At the same time highly incom-
petent individuals will remain in policy-making positions "because they vere
able to utilize their hereditary prestige to insure their appointment and
tenure in the post.
Closely related to this regimented social structure is the distribution
of the land holdings and of the general wealth of the society as well as the
large income disparities which predominate in the backward nations. The
planner will have a difficult time in designing a positive program to solve
the most important problem of these nations (agriculture) so long as a quasi-
feudalistic land-ownership arrangement exists. The breaking up of huge es-
tates is difficult "because often the aristocracy has a significant financial
role in the political parties and a substantial role in determining who shall
be at the head of the government.
The great concentration of money wealth poses a similar problem. ^ The
need is for the prying of the hoarded or poorly utilized funds from the
wealthy and the transfer of them into the channels of productive investment.
This can be done only through an agressive system of taxation which is, of
course, difficult to institute and which is almost impossible to administer
because of the ability of those very individuals to "buy off" or "avoid" pay-
ment because of their social position.
Precisely the same situation exists for the great disparities in annual
personal income. As will be pointed out in the next chapter, the economic
aristocracy is not interested in reform other than that which is forced upon
them by the threat of revolt. When any necessary concessions are made, they
are usually loaded with provisions which provide substantial subsidies for
\ewis, p. 122.
%fyrdal, p. 130.
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the rich as well as the poor. Until the caste system and other forms of
social rigidities are broken down, it is unlikely that the economic planner
will receive totally sympathetic assistance from the social institutions of
the nations
.
An equally great and far less tangible obstacle which faces the dedi-
cated planner is that of the general morale of the people both in their pri-
vate and political life.
Probably the most devastating problem related to this situation is the
feeling among many of the upper classes that they are above working with their
hands or engaging in many kinds of mercantile operations . Many of the nations
are faced with a large group of individuals who feel that they are suited
only for administrative positions with the government. Some of these are, of
course, highly competent and should, therefore, be welcomed into such a post.
However, those who are there because of political manipulations are more of
an obstruction than an aid.
If these classes are too large, the placement of all of these indi-
viduals can easily result in a cumbersome bureaucratic heirarchy which only
serves to create a muck in which the planning programs are permitted to bog
down. Some nations, such as India, have trained so many such bureaucrats
that they are faced with a group of unemployed intellectuals. Here again,
this problem cannot be overcome until the social barriers and prejudices are
substantially broken. 1
Another problem of public attitude stems from the historic role which
the central political institutions have played in some of these nations.
Most of these nations have experienced near-anarchy for literally thousands
Morris E. Opler, "The Problem of Selective Culture Change", The Progress
of Underdeveloped Areas
,
ed. B. F. Hoselitz (Chicago: The Univers ity~of
Chicago Press, 1952), p. 130.
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of years. The people have "been used to obeying the commands of the leaders
of their own social groups and have not been accustomed to following the
directives of a national authority, particularly when they have been opposed
to their own class interests or to the policies of the tribe, village, or
province
.
1
Time is needed for these people to become acclimated to the new polit-
ical structure and to revise their thinking so as to see the problems of dev-
elopment in national as well as in personal terms and to appreciate the need
for occasional submission when the majority of the people favor policies
other than those which they favor or when the progress of development means
a short-term sacrifice on their part in order to receive long-run national
gain.
In addition to poor social morale from the public, a similar situation
can often be observed within the ranks of the government. Just as the indi-
viduals in their personal lives are not used to thinking in terms of ef-
ficiency and cooperation, many government employees are also not sufficiently
appreciative of many of the problems facing the economic planner. The tenuous
methods of making government appointments combined with a peculiar lack of a
tradition of thinking in terms of action and efficient implementation of
policies often causes a planning agency to tend to fall over its own feet
and to provide its own obstacles to its success. 2
Compounding these social and cultural problems are governmental and
other institutional structures and organizations which are incompatible with
"Wrdal, p. 131.
2Lewis, p. 123.
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an effective planning "body. First of all, most backward nations have been
characterized by a notorious decentralization of political power. Decision
making has too long been concentrated at the local, or, at best, the provin-
cial level.
An effective economic plan must be, as earlier mentioned, both national
and comprehensive, and, while the adverse implications of over- centralization
are possibly even more severe than those of the present system, there is,
hopefully, a happy medium which tends to negate the disadvantages of both
extremes. Local governments, however, are strong so as to protect local in-
terests and will not give ground easily. Only through the technique of the
often alluded-to public educative process can this obstacle be eliminated.
The result of the existence of this inimical organization is that many of
the policies suggested by the plan are rendered sterile.
Primary examples of such policies are the progressive income tax and
the confiscatory land tax which the local governments, especially in the areas
at which they are primarily aimed, just seem to be unable to collect. The
essential point is that in many cases, virtually the entire institutional
structure below the level of the national government is unsympathetic, and,
sometimes, down right hostile to economic planning or, for that matter, eco-
nomic development in general.
These problems of misdirected authority on the local level are often
compounded and even encouraged by the presence of great political instability
2in the national administration. Constant threats of revolution and counter-
revolution, such as have predominated much of Africa and Asia, makes a success-
ful governmental program in any field nothing more than a frivolous dream.
1Myrdal, p. 133.
Krause, p. k&.
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When instability exists, economic planning, one of the more complex govern-
mental undertakings, becomes quickly ineffective, if instituted at all, and
the "in" power "becomes too concerned with the day-to-day tenure problems to
he sufficiently interested in making large-scale economic reform or in creat-
ing a workable economic plan.
Outside the governmental sphere, equally formidable obstructions exist
in abundance. Most important, in light of creating a more unified national
state and a revitalized esprit de corps , is the weak, if not non-existent,
communications network. In the broadest sense, communications includes
everything from radio and telegraph to roads and highways, and, in many na-
tions, all of these facets are in need of substantial improvement. The gov-
ernments in most nations involved in economic planning have been making large
portions of their funds available for social overhead capital to improve the
communications system. Even now a backward nation which possesses thorough
and efficient network of roads, airlines, and similar items is non-existent
.
The crux of the problem is that there is a high correlation between
the degree of efficiency of the communications system of a nation and the de-
gree of centralization of decision making which is possible. This conjecture
can easily be confirmed by examining the history of frontier America and ob-
serving the impact which the vast improvements in communications during the
last of the nineteenth and the start of the twentieth century had upon the
decline in the importance of the county seat as a policy-making and adminis-
trative body, and the concurrent increase in the political potency of the
state governments.
The growth of the communications industries is limited, however, by
^-Myrdal, p. 134.
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another institutional obstacle to planning, that of the poorly organized and
•weakly administered educational system. The entire prohlem of public morale
cannot he overcome significantly until the masses are educated. Such edu-
cation cannot he secured so long as the public educational facilities are
not widely extended on both an intensive and an extensive basis. This prob-
lem can be, and needless to say has been, somewhat alleviated in key positions
by the utilization of foreign educational institutions. This is, however,
only a stop- gap measure, because the number which can be trained in this manner
is necessarily limited, and a national point of view through education is
virtually impossible to attain without a major internal realignment of the
educational system.
An additional problem which faces the economic planner is the lack of a
sufficient degree of organization within the labor market. The industrialized
sectors of many backward nations have been unionized to prevent the continued
exploitation of the workers by the foreign and domestic producers who are anx-
ious to capitalize and to continue to capitalize on the cheap native labor.
The government has, however, generally proven too weak to provide a
firm legal basis from which the labor organizations could take-off, such as
has been done in the Western nations, or to even give them any great degree
2
of encouragement or backing in disputes. The result is that collective bar-
gaining is weak and unable to help correct the wealth and income disparities
or to aid in the more efficient allocation of, and training of, the labor
force, or to institute any significant form of fringe benefits.
3
1Ibid., p. 132
2Ibid
., p. 131
3Ibid.
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In addition to the weak labor movement, the organization of the hanking
and finance systems in most of these nations has also been particularly in-
effective. A strong economic plan requires stringent credit control in order
to prevent run-away inflation or frivolous consumption, and the banking system
is not sufficiently organized in most backward nations to allow such re-
straints. The obvious result of this situation is that the planning author-
ity is continually in danger of having many of its programs sabotaged by easy
money enthusiasts and black-market operators. 1
The last institutional obstacle to be discussed is the over-dependence
upon rather rigid tie-in through foreign agreements with the economies of the
2
other nations of the world. The importation of foreign capital is obviously
vital in the stage of economic development which the backward nations are now
progressing through, but the result of too heavy a dependence upon a few
large nations is that fluctuations in the economy of the advanced nations can
have disastrous effects upon that of the backward nations who spend a rela-
tively large percentage of their national income on foreign goods and do a
significant amount of their investment with foreign funds. A recession in
an advanced nation is sometimes capable of wiping out several years of progress
in the backward country brought about by even the most efficient and potent
economic plan. Foreign dependence must, therefore be as diversified as pos-
sible and looked upon as a short-term stop-gap measure only, if economic
planning is to become secure in its foundation and dependably productive.
1Lewis, p. 126.
2Krause, pp. 73-7^.
^Lewis, p. 126.
^The economic outlook is not entirely bleak, however, because there are
several steps vhich the underdeveloped nations have been and can continue to
take to alleviate these cultural and institutional obstacles . These methods
center around building what Myrdal calls a new social infrastructure. Such
an infrastructure has been built up in the Soviet Union by utilizing a strong,
totalitarian, monolithic state which thoroughly integrates all of the seg-
ments of the economy under one central authority
.
Most of the underdeveloped nations have expressed a desire to follow a
more flexible, less autocratic technique than that used by the Soviet Union.
They have been attempting to build a new type of decentralized, but coordinated,
political and economic organization below the national level which places heavy
emphasis upon local initiative and extensive public participation on a flex-
ible basis, but one which is simultaneously guided and directed by national
legislation which is more sympathetic to the goals of economic planning and
development.
The more advanced of the developing nations have made tangible progress
in reconstructing the local and provisional governments out of the material
salvaged from the former institutions along patterns set up by the develop-
ment of the nations of the Western world. Considerable interest has been
shown in creating numerous coordinated councils which are each assigned spe-
cific social interests for which they are responsible. These are not only de-
signed to coordinate inter- industry operations, but also to act as aggressive
machinery for the promotion of increased levels of public morale.
In agriculture, these nations have responded by the activation of the
1ltyrdal, p. 132.
2
Ibid., p. 133.
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cooperatives designed to raise the general level of productivity through the
promotion of new technology and larger-scale operations. Similar cooperative
efforts are "being instituted in the financial system to "bring the credit pol-
icies under greater dominance of the planning "board and to eliminate the
"black-market operators which have traditionally sabotaged the efforts of the
central authorities. These nations are also "beginning to put more emphasis
on lahor organizations and upon providing the necessary social legislation
to insure their continued growth and increased effectiveness. 2
These tendencies toward social reorganization "by some of the planning
and development leaders gives rise to the general feeling, and, seemingly
valid assumption, that the nations which are just beginning to think in terms
of economic progress can and will remove their social obstacles to planning
"by similar means. But for all of the nations, these obstacles exist, still,
to a greater or lesser degree. As long as they exist they will serve only to
sabotage the economic plan and impede the general development process. It is
essential to remember, however, that the backward nations face the immediate
problem of building new institutions
. This can only be done through public
policy. And a coordinated public policy, almost by nature implies the ex-
istence of an economic plan.
Factor and Technical Limitations
As large and important as the social and institutional obstacles are,
economic planning is also limited by obstructions of another type; the lack
of certain essential factors of production and of some basic technical know-
how. One problem related to factor limitations is that of the shortage of raw
1Jbid t
2Ibid., p. 134.
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materials. No nation in the vorld is exactly like any other in its natural
endowment. Some nations have an abundance of many factors, needing to im-
port only a few from the outside vorld. Others may have a noteworthy stock
of a very few rare resources while simultaneously experiencing a total ab-
sence of many other equally vital factors. A few nations simply have a short-
age or absence of virtually everything
.
Most of the underdeveloped nations tend to fall more or less in the
second category. Probably none of them have the factor endowment which ex-
ists in the United States and equally few are totally devoid of any kind of
exploitable resource. In any case, the important thing is that none are in
a position to develop by themselves. No matter how well the economic plan
is formulated, and no matter how many bridges it calls for, there will be
very few bridges built if there exists an acute shortage of cement and steel.
This means that the planners will have to devise permanent sources of raw
materials outside the nation. This is no stop-gap measure, since the short-
age is chronic and natural, and one which cannot be solved by a mere in-
stitutional reorientation.
Another type of factor difficulty is that of capital accumulation. This
differs from the scarcity of raw materials in that, to a great extent, in a
2developing country this will be only a short-term problem. The necessary
capital funds are usually present, but because of the traditionally uncertain
marginal efficiency of capital and because of the wide disparities in the
holdings of wealth, large sums of investment funds which can be used to further
the cause of capital accumulation, are never induced into use as productive
investment
.
^Krause, p. h-7
.
2Krause, p. 48.
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It has already "been pointed out that this situation can be alleviated
by an effective system of taxation combined with an active program of gov-
ernment investment. But as we have seen, the problems of effective implemen-
tation are very great and the capital is needed at the present time . This
makes the effectiveness of the economic plan dependent upon the funds vhich
can be received through foreign grants, loans, and investments. The problems
involved here, the tied loans, the hesitation on the part of the private for-
eign investors, and the political contest between the Communist and the Non-
Communist sectors of the world, are too well-known to need elaboration here.
Nevertheless, the failure to secure such foreign financing will, in the
short-run, prove to be a devastating blow to the implementation of the eco-
nomic plan.
In addition to these acute factor shortages, planning is also limited
by the problem of securing modern technology and usable skills in a short
period of time. Technology and technical knowhow always plays the role of a
parameter of economic progress, but in the backward nations it often is
stifling to an inexcusable degree. The solution of many technical problems
is unknown to all men, but much of the technical knowledge which exists in
the advanced nations of the world has not been effectively transmitted to the
underdeveloped areas. This is particularly true in the sector in most imme-
diate need of economic development, namely, agriculture. While improvements
have been brought about in agriculture through the introduction of the cooper-
ative movement, most of the food obtained in the backward nations is produced
by techniques which are primitive by any standard, and the situation does not
show great promise of changing drastically in the immediate future.
^-Ityrdal, p. 133.
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The general lack of technology comes, in some industries, from a lack
of capital, in others, from a lack of public education, in others, from a
combination of these two elements. Once again, then, we have a problem whose
adequate solution depends upon a unique combination of public education and
structural changes.
The presence of this general problem only serves to point out a basic
difference, in fundamental terms, between the successes of the advanced na-
tions and the failures of the others. Most of the advanced nations, particu-
larly England and Germany, do not have an abundance of all the necessary fac-
tors of production, or, at least in the early stages of their development,
all of the available technical knoxrhow.
Nations such as these have from time to time throughout their history
gone out of their way to make sure that the essential foreign supply of these
resources would be forthcoming. The underdeveloped nations, on the other
hand, have gone out of their way for so few things involving national action
that historians commonly refer to many of these nations, particularly those
of Africa, as having no true national history. The advanced nations saw their
shortages and did something about it; fighting, colonizing, negotiating, and
confiscating. The backward nations also saw their shortcomings, or at least
some of them, but, until recently, they simply sat on their hands and accepted
these inadequacies just as they would a bolt of lightning or a drop of rain. 2
The successful elimination of these obstacles depends, then, upon the
intensity of the desire of these nations to change their attitudes towards
these problems. Since the world is not so openly uncivilized as it was during
the building of the British Empire and the rise of mercantilism, much hope lies
1Jbid., p. 119,
2
Ibid.
,
p. 121.
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in willingness of other nations to give their support. It is due to these
obstacles that no presently underdeveloped nation of the world has been able
to fully engage itself in the construction of an economic plan even as potent
as those existing in the VJestern world.
Planning is more of an idea and a form than a reality. For example,
even India, the most effectively planned nation of the backward world, is
referred to by Myrdal and others as little more than a "functioning anarchy".
If planning is to be more than this, the aforementioned obstacles, as well as
others peculiar to the individual nations, must be removed. The West has
shown that they can be, but it is up to the developing nations themselves to
convincingly prove that they will be.
1Ibld
., p. 123.
SUMMABY
Economic planning, while far from a new concept, has won its place in
economic thinking during the past few years in many of the underdeveloped and
advanced nations alike. The greatest apparent need for planning has been in
the underdeveloped nations and it is in these countries that planninc has
been most widely utilized. The dominant school of thought in economic plan-
ning is the rationalist school. This type of planning attempts to guide a
rationalistic man through a process which will produce a more efficient allo-
cation of the factors of production. It is possible, hy synthesizing the def-
initions referred to in this report, to define economic planning as a ration-
alistic program for future action hased upon the successes and failures of
past performances and the ever- changing goals and yardsticks of the contem-
porary social and economic values.
The need for such planning is believed to come from the inability of
the underdeveloped nations to provide 1) economic stability and 2) rising
levels of national income. In order to alleviate this situation, the planners,
through their efforts, hope to 1) provide a stable economic foundation upon
which the desired economic superstructure can be built, 2) direct the fiscal
and monetary policies of the nation in such a way that a favorable climate
for capital accumulation can be created., 3) control the foreign trade of the
nation so as to minimize balance-of-payments difficulties, h) utilize pro-
gressive taxation, etc., to provide a means by which ax-ante savings can be
efficiently transmitted into productive investment, and 5) control and direct
the supply of labor and remove the basic imperfections from the labor market
through the medium of public education.
Economic planning consists of two basic stages: formulation and imple-
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mentation. While "both of these are involved and complicated processes, many
economists feel that the implementive stage is the crucial and more difficult
stage. The formulation can be divided into four stages. In the first stage,
the potential national income figures are estimated and a broad budget is
formulated for the economy as a whole. From this budget, the national budgets
for consumption, investment and governmental expenditures are derived, based
upon both economic data and an appraisal of the social and institutional fac-
tors which form the parameters of the various budgets. From these budgets,
four more can be set forth, namely: 1) the budget for each industry in serious
disequilibrium, 2) the budget for each raw material likely to be in disequi-
librium, 3) the manpower budget, and h) the foreign trade budget.
The second stage of planning is involved with the determination of the
specific action which is to be undertaken to overcome the basic deficiencies
within the economy. This action is designed to 1) increase the sources of
supply of the necessary factors, or, that failing, 2) limit the demand for the
scarce factors. The third stage is that of setting the targets. This in-
volves the quantitative estimation of the degree to which the action taken in
the second stage will relieve the disequilibrating conditions. Targets, how-
ever, should be set rationally and in terms of economic capacity, not from
political considerations. The final stage of planning is that of publishing
and discussing the targets set in the third stage. This is essential so that
the public can analyze and criticize the planning operation. This appears to
be a vital step if the nation is not to run the risk of having planning sub-
stituted for, rather being utilized as a supplement to, democracy.
The plan should be primarily of a short-run nature. Long-run plans are
not feasible, except' in some capital-intensive industries such as power, due
to the fact that exogenous factors, such as fluctuations in the international
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market, are too unpredictable, and "because the political and economic con-
ditions in these nations are often far from stable. (Long-run planning tends
to lead to discarding short-run in favor of long-run targets.) Planning
should also be as non-directive in nature as is possible. The market system,
while having certain imperfections, does have useful functions to serve, par-
ticularly in regards to measuring consumer tastes and setting the prices of
the commodities
.
Failure to use the market for these purposes will mean that
a vast administrative staff will have to be used to make these calculations.
Most of the underdeveloped nations have a shortage of such personnel and also
lack sufficient statistics to make such calculations sufficiently accurate.
Precise and definite statistics can perform valuable functions in planning,
hut they are far from being the prerequisite for its success. In many cases
when statistics are usually meaningless, they had best be discarded completely.
Regional planning can also serve an important place in the planning
process. Many problems are confined to a single area, and many other are more
acute in one particular area than in the nation as a whole. These regional
plans need to be thoroughly coordinated so that they will complement the na-
tional plan as a whole. As was earlier pointed out, many economists feel that
the more difficult phase of planning is its implementation. If planning
fails, it usually bogs down in this stage. Failure at this stage may be
caused 1) "by a lack of a sufficient supply of trained personnel, 2) by an in-
herently weak governmental structure, or 3) by a historical and ingrained un-
willingness on the part of the public to follow the directives of the govern-
ment. Successful implementation usually necessitates the reorganization of
certain parts of the governmental framework, possibly in the form of consti-
tutional reforms, or in reforms within the selection systems for the adminis-
trative personnel. In some cases, it may be necessary to build an entire
5*
infrastructure independent of the governmental .framework. This method, how-
ever, runs the risk that the new structure will attempt to control both the
economic and political sphere of public life. If the public refuses to co-
operate with the suggestions of the planning agency, it is often possible to
influence their actions by nationalizing or by threatening to nationalize,
certain industries. The important observation, however, is that action can-
not be substituted for by speech-making. Speech-making, if not accompanied
by action tends to become planning by exhortation which is tantamount to not
planning at all.
Implementation, if successful, in essence requires the removal of the
various obstacles which have previously inhibited economic development in the
underdeveloped nations. These obstacles are both cultural and institutional.
They can also be in the form of factor and technical limitations. Examples of
the cultural and institutional obstacles are 1) the caste and class systems
which tend to predominate many underdeveloped nations and which serve to limit
labor mobility, 2) the large income disparities which make capital accumulation
difficult, 3) the great concentrations of wealth which prevents the proper
allocation of land and capital, h) the economic aristocracy which tends to
have more than its share of the political prestige and which tends to attempt
to preserve the status quo and thereby injure the development process, 5) the
lack of public morale or of an intrinsic "desire for development", 6) political
instability which prevents effective planning from taking place, 7) the lack
of communications systems which makes inter-regional coordination more diffi-
cult, 8) poor governmental protection of labor organizations which tends to
inhibit their growth, and 9) the rigidity of economic tie-ins which makes the
underdeveloped nations too dependent upon the economies of the advanced
countries.
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The factor and technical limitations are due to 1) the lack of suffi-
cient natural endowment of basic raw materials, and 2) the lack of a sufficient-
ly potent educational system to promote the extensive expansion of technical
knowledge. The former problem can be overcome only with the increased use of
foreign trade, and the second, only with the advent of the necessary structur-
al changes which will permit the efficient communication of technological ad-
vances to the public.
,,
The entire development process is dependent upon the removal of these
obstacles
.
This paper would tend to indicate that economic planning is one
method of doing the job. But the plan alone is not enough. It must be com-
bined with a rising morale on the part of the public. To date, however,
planning has not had the aid of this general cooperation, and therefore, tends
to fall down in the vital process of transforming the basic ideas into reality.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this report is to examine the role of economic planning
in the future development of the underdeveloped nations of the world. It is
primarily concerned with the tools of planning and the ways in which they can
he best utilized in the formulation and implementation of such a plan.
While the earliest ideas on planning can be traced to the writings of
Plato, this concept did not truly carve its niche in economic thought until
after World War I. The earlier writings were primarily steeped in socialist
tradition. Not until the last few decades has the Socialistic approach
shown signs of succumbing to the less egalitarian rationalist approach. It
is this latter approach, however, which serves as the foundation for this
report
.
Economic planning is defined by this author as a rationalistic program
for future action based upon the successes and failures of past performances
and upon the ever- changing goals and yardsticks of the contemporary social
and economic values.
The prime objective of planning is the mobilization of the resources
needed to secure rising standards of living and greater economic stability.
It is necessitated because of the unique inability of the underdeveloped
nations to secure these objectives by less stringent means. This desired
progress has been impossible in these nations due to social and institutional
obstacles which are particularly inimical to efficient resource allocation
and to the developmental process as a whole
.
This report stresses the importance of inducing cooperation between
the various heretofore poorly integrated segments of the economy through the
explicit assertion of governmental policy. The importance of granting the
planning agency the means to implement as well as formulate is also emphasized.
Such an approach brings out the futility of formulating a plan without
having at the planner's disposal the proper tools for the implementation
of such a plan.
